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Abstract
This Note argues that the issues raised by transborder data flow restrictions must be dealt with
on a global scale, not on a national basis. Part I of this Note discusses the international legal
principles underlying the concept of freedom of information and the legal difficulties presented
by the imposition of transborder data flow restrictions. Part II analyzes the perception among
developing nations that sovereign rights are threatened by an unrestricted flow of information and
discusses the measures developing nations are implementing to control this perceived threat. Part
III analyzes several approaches suggested for dealing with the problems of transborder data flow
restrictions and argues that a new international forum must be created to constructively address
the legitimate concerns of the developing nations. This Note concludes that since the effective
demise of Unesco, progress must be made toward creating a viable international forum to address
the multilateral concerns over transborder data flow restrictions.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION VERSUS NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THE NEED FOR A NEW GLOBAL
FORUM FOR THE RESOLUTION OF TRANSBORDER
DATA FLOW PROBLEMS
INTRODUCTION
Both developed and developing nations accept the princi-
ple of freedom of information, that is, that governmental con-
straints on information are undesirable.' Yet the views and
definitions of freedom of information are markedly different. 2
Developing nations fear that their stability and political inde-
pendence may be eroded by an influx of information reflecting
the foreign economic, political, and moral values of developed
nations. Accordingly, many developing nations believe that
1. See Cleveland, The Twilight of Hierarchy: Speculations on the Global Information Soci-
ety, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 185, 194 (1985). Developed nations' concern over the con-
trol of information focuses on two primary areas: multinational corporations are vig-
orously opposed to information control of any kind due to the greatly increased pro-
duction costs that will ensue, see generally McKeaver, Is it Best Not to Regulate Transborder
Data Flow?, INT'L Bus. L.Aw., Apr. 1984, at 159; Samiee, Transnational Data Flow Con-
straints: A New Challenge for Multinational Corporations, 1984 J. INr'L Bus. STUD. 141, and
governmental organizations are concerned, or at least cloak their concern, with the
belief that freedom of information is a basic human right. In 1946, the United
Nations General Assembly acknowledged that "freedom of information is a funda-
mental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United
Nations is consecrated." G.A. Res. 59(1), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 95 (65th plen. mtg.)
(1946). Individual nations also acknowledge the principle of freedom of information.
See, e.g., BURMA CONST. art. 157 ("Every citizen shall have freedom of speech, expres-
sion and publication .... ") reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 40 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1979) (hereinafter "Blaustein"); CUBA
CONST. art. 52 ("Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with the
objectives of socialist society.") reprinted in 4 Blaustein, supra, at 21; EGYPT CONST. art.
48 ("Freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass media shall be guaran-
teed."), reprinted in 4 Blaustein, supra, at 22.
2. See 31 U.N. ESCOR Annex (Agenda Item 10, part II) at 9, U.N. Doc. E/3443
(1961) (statement of Dr. Hilding Eek, Report on Developments in the Field of Free-
dom of Information Since 1954).
All governments seem to agree that freedom of information is a fundamen-
tal right, that peoples should be made to avoid false or distorted reports or
the dissemination of opinions inciting war or hatred between nations. As
regards, however, the means of achieving a situation within nations and
amongst them, characterized by a free and abundant flow of truthful infor-
mation and by useful interchange of opinion, there is no general agreement.
The concept of freedom of information as a legal concept is strongly contro-
versial.
Id.
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regulation of information by transborder data flow 3 restric-
tions is essential to their existence as sovereign nations.4 Thus
3. Transborder data flow, also known as TDF or TBDF, was introduced into
telecommunications language over ten years ago. See Rankin, Business Secrets Across
International Borders: One Aspect of the Transborder Data Flow Debate, 10 CAN. Bus. L.J.
213, 213-15 (1985). It can be defined as "the transmission from one nation to an-
other of units of information coded electronically for processing or storage by one or
more digital computers." Feldman & Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data
Flows, 7 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 1 n.1 (1982). A broader definition relates
transborder data flow to the concept of trade:
[T]oday we are entering into an era in which trade will consist largely of
information exchanges. Even when trade involves non-information ex-
changes, it will nevertheless be totally dependent upon information ex-
change systems. These systems born of the computer coupled with the tech-
nology of communications create a relatively inexpensive means to transmit
massive amounts of data rapidly and efficiently over great distances and
across national borders. The transmission of such information is commonly
known as "transborder data flow."
McGuire, The Information Age. An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20 JURIMETRICS
J. 1, 1-2 (1979).
Transborder data flow can include media products, news broadcasts, telephone
conversations and telex services. See Rankin, supra, at 215. It allows processed data
to be transmitted in a variety of forms, including physically, such as by an individual
carrying a computer disk across a national border, or electronically, by a terrestrial
line, submerged cable or satellite link. See Novotny, Transborder Data Flow: Technical
Issues of Legal Concern, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 105, 106 (1981). Transborder data flow is
created, however, through three primary activities: a) intra-corporate information
transfers; b) international information transfers between governments; and c) trans-
national pursuit of information resources. See Rankin, supra, at 221.
Restrictions on transborder data flow can take many forms: direct regulation,
such as licensing, registration, disclosure of information on data content, distribution
and ownership, or indirect regulation, such as manipulating trade rules, tax incen-
tives and tariff barriers. See Bach, Law and Politics in Transborder Data Flow, 14 LAw
TECH. 1, 10-13 (1981). Nations can require registration and licensing of data banks,
limits on the duration of permissible data retention, prior authorization for trans-
border transmission, rights of notice to data subjects, procedures to insure security
and confidentiality and the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance. Dunn, Advice
to the U.S. Corporation Operating Abroad: The Costs of Transporting Information, 9 ASILS
I.L.J. 61, 68 (1985).
Since 1973, the following nations have adopted legislation restricting trans-
border data flow: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
Yugoslavia. 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No.2, at 15 (1980).
4. Sovereignty can be defined in several ways. Developing nations generally
adopt a broad definition of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, while developed nations
focus on the supreme law giving and law enforcing ability of a nation. Many develop-
ing nations divide sovereignty into economic sovereignty and cultural sovereignty.
Economic sovereignty is threatened by controls placed upon segments of the econ-
omy by foreign corporations, international data networks or governments. See
Groshan, Transnational Data Flows: Is the Idea of an International Legal Regime Relevant in
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while both developed and developing nations speak of free-
dom of information and sovereignty, they clearly employ dif-
ferent definitions of the same terms. This problem is exacer-
bated by the recent demise of Unesco as a forum for resolving
conflicts among nations regarding regulation of transborder
data flow. A new international legal framework is needed to
provide the necessary solutions.5
This Note argues that the issues raised by transborder
data flow restrictions must be dealt with on a global scale, not
on a national basis. 6 Transborder data flow restrictions that
differ from nation to nation make it difficult and expensive to
conduct business or to provide complete information for gov-
ernmental decision-making. Part I of this Note discusses the
international legal principles underlying the concept of free-
dom of information and the legal difficulties presented by the
imposition of transborder data flow restrictions. Part II ana-
lyzes the perception among developing nations that sovereign
rights are threatened by an unrestricted flow of information
and discusses the measures developing nations are implement-
ing to control this perceived threat. Part III analyzes several
approaches suggested for dealing with the problems of trans-
border data flow restrictions and argues that a new interna-
tional forum must be created to constructively address the le-
gitimate concerns of the developing nations. This Note con-
Establishing Multilateral Controls and Legal Norms?, 14 LAW TECH. 1, 12-13 (1981). Cul-
tural sovereignty can be threatened by the influence the new technology may have on
a nation's culture and people. Developing nations fear that transborder data flow
may undermine cultural growth by forcing it into foreign patterns. Id. at 13. See infra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
6. One expert estimates that by the end of the 'century, two-thirds of all the
world's work will be "information" related work. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 186.
The dominance of information services during the present decade has been termed
the "information age" or the "post-industrial information age." Parker, Information
Services and Economic Growth, 1 INFORMATION Soc'Y 71 (1981). The information age is
defined as "an age in which information activities dominate our economies and our
societies." Id. The increasing domination of information has led to growth in a mul-
titude of areas. Computers and telecommunication devices are replacing traditional
items as dominant commodities and new industries and careers have developed
around the accounting, information-processing and production efficiencies afforded
by new devices like "computer-assisted design" and "robotics." See Lautsch, Com-
puters, Communications and the Wealth of Nations: Some Theoretical and Policy Considerations
About an Information Economy, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 101-02 (1983).
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cludes that since the effective demise of Unesco, 7 progress
must be made toward creating a viable international forum to
address the multilateral concerns over transborder data flow
restrictions.
I. INTERNATIONAL LA WAND TRANSBORDER DATA
FLO W RESTRICTIONS
Transborder data flow is a relatively recent phenomenon'
that has broadened the possibilities of information transmis-
sion beyond the traditional channels of radio, television and
newsprint to communication between computers located in
distant parts of the globe. 9 It is elusive, occurs almost instanta-
neously and physically frees data from national constraints.' 0
Data can now exist in many places at once, move rapidly from
nation to nation and be controlled by those operating the data
system." The current technology that allows information to
cross national borders gives nations the ability to control the
transmission and reception of information through the use of
transborder data flow restrictions. 12 Unfortunately, the inter-
7. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
8. The term itself came into usage only about a decade ago. See Rankin, supra
note 3, at 213.
9. See Groshan, supra note 4, at 3-4. Transborder data flow can include media
products, news broadcasts, telephone conversations, as well as more recently devel-
oped technology, such as electronic message services, electronic mail and electronic
funds transfers. See Novotny, Transborder Data Flows and International Law: A Framework
for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 141, 143-44 (1980).
10. See Groshan, supra note 4, at 3.
11. Id.
12. The ability to regulate information across national boundaries translates
into the exercise of power. See Bach, Law and Politics in Transborder Data Flow, 14 LAw
TECH. 1, 3 (1981). As one commentator has stated: "Information is power and eco-
nomic information is economic power. Information has an economic value and the
ability to store and process certain types of data may well give one country political
and technological advantage over other c6untries.", H.R. REP. No. 96-905, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (statement of Louis Joinet, former Secretary-General of
the French Commission on Data Processing).
Brazil provides an example of direct regulation of transborder data flow in the
developing world, and, in fact, has served as something of a model for other develop-
ing countries considering transborder data flow restrictions. See Rowan & Waite, In-
ternational Communications Law, Part I.- Maitland Commission, Economic Development, and the
United States, 19 INT'L LAw. 1339, 1345 (1985). In 1979, the Brazilian government
established the Special Informatics Agency (SEI) to regulate all transborder data
flow. See M. Ripper &J. Wanderley, The Brazilian Computer and Communications
Regulatory Environment and Transborder Data Flow Policy 3 (June 1980) (unpub-
lished paper presented to the International Bureau for Informatics World Confer-
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national legal framework that presently governs this transmis-
sion of information has not been expanded to deal with re-
cently developed types of information flow.' 3 The result is a
legal system and legal analysis that has not kept pace with tech-
nological advances.' 4
Developing nations equate control of information with the
ence on Transborder Data Flow Policies) cited in Bortnick, International Information
Flow: The Developing World Perspective, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 33_, 342 n.53 (1981).
SEI examines potential transborder data flow on a case by case basis and deter-
mines what impact the services will have on economic, privacy and national sover-
eignty concerns. Based on this analysis, the application to transmit TDF is accepted,
rejected or conditionally accepted. See Bortnick, supra, at 342.
Canada provides another example of transborder data flow restrictions. Inter-
estingly, Canada sees itself in a position identical to that of developing nations in the
dispute over loss of sovereignty due to unrestricted transborder data flow. See gener-
ally CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS FOR CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY, CANADIAN DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS AND CANADA (1979) [hereinafter "Clyne Committee Report"]. Can-
ada's minister of Communication said in 1980 that while Canada is "a sophisticated
country in terms of new communications technologies and application .... [it] also
share[s] with developing countries many concerns related to political, cultural and
economic sovereignty ... and identity.'" P. HAJNAL, GUIDE TO UNESCO 255 (1983)
(quoting a statement on the MacBride Commission's report presented at the twenty-
first session of Unesco's General Conference by G.I. Warren, Canadian representa-
tive). Canada has imposed various transborder data flow restrictions, such as those
contained in the 1980 Banks and Banking Law Revision Act. See Banks and Banking
Law Revision Act, 1980, Can. Stat. Ch. 40, Secs. 157 (4), (5), and (6). This Act re-
quires that data produced by Canadian banks be processed in Canada, unless a spe-
cial exemption is obtained. Id. In practice, this means that banks must rely on com-
puters in Canada, not in the United States, and, on average, the cost of data process-
ing in Canada is twenty to twenty-five percent more expensive than in the United
States. See Hardy, Transborder Data Flow: An Overview and Critique of Recent Concerns, 9
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247, 252 (1983).
13. See Ploman, Transborder Data Flows: The International Legal Framework, 3 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 551, 556 (1982).
14. As one commentator states: "The adaption to changing circumstances is
mainly patchwork... [n]either national legislation nor international rules provide for
a coherent communications or information law. Such law as exists is pluralistic, un-
coordinated and based on limited, functional objectives." Id. at 556. Another com-
mentator states the conflict that transborder data flow restrictions present in interna-
tional law:
[W]hen the source of the telecommunications is beyond the boundaries of
the State, problems of control arise that have yet to find an adequate solu-
tion in terms of international law. It becomes necessary to distinguish be-
tween the right of a State to do what it pleases within its own territory, and
the claim of the State to legally object to an activity originating beyond its
borders but which has an internal effect.
D. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL 2 (1969). See generally Eger,
The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 203,
231-34 (1981).
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exercise of sovereignty' 5 while many developed nations con-
sider such restriction of information as a denial of a fundamen-
tal human right.16 The meaning of freedom of information
17
and a nation's legal right to control that information have been
fervently debated. '8
Although virtually all nations acknowledge the legal prin-
ciple of freedom of information 9 , they interpret the word
"freedom" in different ways. Western nations define "free-
dom" of information as the unrestricted transfer of informa-
tion, while many developing nations define it as a balanced
15. The definition of sovereignty used by developing and developed nations dif-
fers. Developing nations seem to adopt a definition that emphasizes exclusive juris-
diction over a certain territory. A definition contained in Canada's Clyne Committee
Report, supra note 12, is typical of that used by developing nations: sovereignty is
"the ability of Canadians [both in government and in the private sector] to exercise
control over the.., direction of economic, social, cultural, and political change.' "Id.
at 1 (quoting Dr. Peter Robinson).
Developed nations, on the other hand, seem to adopt a narrower definition,
characterizing sovereignty as the "supreme legal authority of the nation to give and
enforce the law within a nation and territory." CompareJESSUP, MODERN LAw OF NA-
TIONS 40 (1968) with H. MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 305 (rev. 5th ed.
1978).
The developing nations believe that their ability to exercise control over their
nation and people is threatened by unrestricted transborder data flow; the developed
nations, using their definition, counter that unrestricted transborder data flow en-
hances rather than threatens the ability to enforce the law. See generally Gross, Interna-
tional Law Aspects of the Freedom of Information and the Right to Communicate in THE THIRD
WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 55 (P. Horton ed. 1978). See also Cleveland, supra note 1,
at 195.
16. See infra notes 76-106 and accompanying text.
17. The definition of "freedom of information" varies with political persuasion.
"Free" can be defined as information controlled by the market economy - so that
what is profitable is transmitted; government neither controls nor monitors the infor-
mation. The converse of "free" flow of information is "balanced" flow of informa-
tion. This is information regulated by government, as to both content and quality,
with the desired end being a "fair and just" presentation. See generally Masmoudi, The
New World Information Order, 29J. COMM. 172 (1979).
18. Unesco has been at the center of debate on the significance of freedom of
information and sovereignty. The composition of Unesco, predominated by devel-
oping nations, makes it an ideal development ground for ideas in this field but, in
turn, it gives its proclamations what many feel is a decidedly anti-Western bias. See
generally Theberge, U.N.E. S.C. 0. s "New World Information Order": Colliding with First
Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714 (1981).
19. See statement of Dr. Hilding Eek, supra note 2. See also Note, A New Interna-
tional Information Order: The Developing World and the Free Flow of Information Controversy,
8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 249, 249-50 (1980).
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transfer.20 A balanced transfer of information means informa-
tion freed from developed world bias through government
monitoring and control. 2' The dispute over whether "free"
means unrestricted or balanced transfer of information is not
clarified by international agreements or the traditional legal
principles on which they depend for their enforcement. In ad-
dition, the increasing politicization of Unesco has made it inef-
fectual as an international forum for the resolution of disputes
over transborder data flow restrictions.
A. Existing International Agreements
The primary international agreements that refer to free-
dom of information are the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights2" (Declaration) and the International Covenant on Civil
20. An interesting analogy to the developing nation viewpoint is taken by the
Soviet Union. The following is an excerpt from a Soviet textbook:
For over a quarter of a century legal scholars have now been arguing as
to whether there is a universally recognized principle of the freedom of in-
formation in international law. The main argument of those who claim that
there is such a principle is the fact that some declarations and conventions
on protecting human rights contain provisions concerning the right of eve-
ryone freely "to seek, receive and import information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers."
These provisions, however, have a different meaning.., human rights
are not in the full sense of the word international. The rights of citizens are
regulated by the legislation of every state on a sovereign basis and indepen-
dently of any external authority.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 190 (A.S. Piradov ed. 1976), quoted in Gross, supra, note
15, at 60.
21. See generally Note, supra note 19, at 258-64.
22. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. 1/777, at 71 (1948) (hereinafter "U.D.H.R.").
Forty-eight countries voted for this resolution, eight abstained; many developing na-
tions were among the supporters including several that now have or are considering
transborder data flow regulations, such as Brazil, India and Nigeria. Those countries
abs taining included the USSR and South Africa.
The relevant provison of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is Article
19, which resolves that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers." Id. at 74-5.
Another major international agreement that might be used to provide a frame-
work in this area is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, arts. 3, 7, 61 Stat.
A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (hereinafter GATT). The United States
and other Western nations have suggested that GATT be extended to cover informa-
tion sources. The response of the developing countries has been to rely on the "in-
fant industry exception," arguing that they must protect and promote their industries
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and Political Rights23 (Covenant). Both the Declaration and
the Covenant have so far proved ineffectual in providing the
legal framework needed to resolve the international legal ques-
tions presented by transborder data flow restrictions. The
Declaration was adopted in 1948 by forty-eight countries, in-
cluding several nations that currently impose or are consider-
ing transborder data flow restrictions. 24 The Declaration is not
generally considered a legally binding document; it is rather a
resolution, made under the auspices of the United Nations
General Assembly.25 It is considered, however, by some jurists
and scholars, to be part of the "fabric of international law
' 2 6
and a tenet of customary international law.27 If the Declaration
is part of customary international law, then both the nations
that voted for it and those that became sovereign nations after
that will be central to their future economic prosperity. See Feketekuty, Restrictions on
Trade in Communication Services, 1984 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 145, 153; see also
W. KIRSCH, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS: A CURRENT REVIEW 67-69 (1983).
23. G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. Annex (No. 16), at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter "Covenant"). Over sixty nations are signatories to this
covenant, including the USSR.
Article 19(2) is the relevant provision: "Everyone shall have the right to free-
dom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." Id.
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. There are two schools of thought on the legal significance of General As-
sembly resolutions. The "traditional school" believes that resolutions can create in-
ternational law, see, e.g., 1 L. GRoss, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZA-
TION 214-20 (1984), while the other school, often referred to as the "progressive
school", argues that resolutions may sometimes have legal significance. See, e.g.,
Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 64 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 349 (1970). See generally Comment, The New International Economic Order and
General Assembly Resolutions: The Debate Over the Legal Effects of General Assembly Resolutions
Revisited, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 647, 665-74 (1985).
26. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 569-71 (3d
ed. 1979); cf. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 408-14 (2d
ed. 1968). See also Eger, supra note 14, at 207.
27. See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1977, at E16, col. 3. (statement of John P.
Humphrey, Former Director of the Human Rights Division in the United Nations
Secretariat) (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has "now become ... part of
the customary law of nations and is therefore binding on all states, whether they
voted for it or not."); see also N.Y. Times, April 1, 1977, at A28, col. 2. (statement of
Eric Suy, Legal Counsel and Undersecretary of the United Nations) ("while it is clear
that a General Assembly declaration does not have the force of law by the mere fact
of its adoption, it is possible that in the course of time such a declaration, if it reflects
the legal conviction of states, may acquire the force of customary international law
through state practice.").
Two elements are generally considered for the creation of customary interna-
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it was adopted are bound to uphold freedom of information as
an international legal principle. 8
When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted in 1948, telecommunications possibilities were limited
compared to today. The scope of communications envisaged
by the United Nations was far narrower than what currently
exists. Additionally, many of the developing nations that are
most concerned about the threat posed by transborder data
flow were not yet independent nations when the Declaration
was adopted. 29 These three factors, the binding nature of the
Declaration, the development of new technology and the
emergence of many new nations, raise questions concerning
the viability of this agreement.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
signed in 1966 by over sixty nations, is a more contemporary
document. 0 It is a treaty, legally binding for its signatories,
which include many developing nations. 3' The Covenant does
tional law: usage, or State practice, and opiniojuris. See Gross, supra note 15, at 55;
Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM.J. INT'L L. 662, 663-68 (1953).
Usage or State practice refers to the positive or negative actions of a particular
State over a period of time. Kunz, supra, at 666. Practice alone, however, is not
sufficient to create customary international law; it must be accompanied by opinio
juris. Opiniojuris is the belief that the State is legally obligated under international law
to act in a particular manner. Id. at 667. The combination of the elements of usage
and opiniojuris is considered sufficient to demonstrate a State's consent to be legally
bound. It is in this sense that many developed nations, particularly the United States,
argue that freedom of information has achieved the status of customary international
law so that restrictive transborder data flow regulations should be prohibited. See
Gross, supra note 15, at 59-64 (discussion of customary international law and free-
dom of information).
There is no doubt that customary international law exists. In Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice, the Court, " whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it," is directed
to apply international conventions and "international custom, as evidence of a gen-
eral practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court ofjustice, art. 38(1),
59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945), T.S. 993, 3 Bevens 1153.
28. Unfortunately, we are now brought back to the issue of what exactly the
term means. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; see also Gross, supra note
20, at 59.
29. From 1947 through 1961, Third World nations increased from approxi-
mately 25% to 47% of the United Nations membership. African states alone in-
creased from approximately 3% - 20% of the total membership.
30. The Covenant was signed eighteen years after the Declaration, which was
signed in 1948. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. The Covenant came into full force without the United States being a party.
See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1977, at E16, col. 3.
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not, in contrast to the Declaration, provide for absolute free-
dom of information.32 While Article 19 of the Covenant pro-
vides for the right of individuals to hold opinions without in-
terference and the right to "freedom of expression" in any me-
dia and of any information or idea, Article 19(3) allows for
restrictions on freedom of expression that may be necessary
for the protection of "national security or of public order (or-
dre public), or of public health or morals." 33 Thus, developing
nations may impose restrictions on information flow in the
name of "sovereign rights," under Article 19(3). 34
Nations can look to the Declaration for a guarantee of ab-
solute freedom of information but there are serious questions
as to whether, since it is only a resolution, it is legally binding
on those nations that voted in its favor. The Covenant is a
treaty, as opposed to a resolution, and therefore it is legally
binding on its signatories but also inadequate because it per-
mits nations to restrict the flow of information if they can link
the restrictions to the protection of sovereign rights.35
B. Unesco's Role In The Transborder Data Flow Debate
The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization(Unesco), was formed in 1945 under the auspices of
the United Nations.3 6 Unesco's members include both devel-
oped and developing nations. Recently, however, developing
nations have gained a majority within Unesco and the organi-
32. Interestingly, this may reflect the differences in the world's composition and
political climate between 1948 and 1966.
33. See Covenant, supra note 23, art. 19(3)(b). Article 19 states:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 [supra note 23] of
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may there-
fore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or
of public health or morals.
Id.
34. See supra notes 76-106 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. UNESCO CONST. (adopted London, 16 November 1945). Unesco's purpose
is to "advanc[e], through education, science and cultural relations of the peoples of
the world, the objectives of international peace and ...[the] common welfare of
mankind." Id. preamble.
1986-1987]
272 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:262
zation has been accused of having an anti-Western bias.3 7 This
development has resulted in the withdrawal of the United
States and Great Britain from the organization during the last
two years.38  The withdrawal of two major developed nations
may have major effects, such as reduced funding for Unesco
programs, increased donations from other nations and, most
importantly, diminished credibility of the organization itself.
Unesco's membership is now weighted toward developing na-
tions and Soviet bloc countries. 39 The preamble to the Unesco
Constitution advocates "unrestricted pursuit of objective truth
and ... the free exchange of ideas and knowledge," 40 but, due
largely to the shift in Unesco membership, the definition of a
"free exchange" has changed.41
37. The United Nations has also undergone a major shift in the nature of its
member states. The disintegration of the various colonial empires in the years fol-
lowing World War II have led to a worldwide increase in newly independent states.
See Comment, supra note 25, at 651. There were fifty-one original members in 1945
but by 1960 the number had increased to over eighty. Id. This influx of new mem-
ber-states resulted in a gradual transformation of the composition of the United Na-
tions, from a Western-dominated organization to a Third World dominated ora-
ganization. See E. MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW
MAKING PROCESS 132 (1979). It has been alleged that this new political majority coa-
lition has a "keen awareness of the possibilities of using the General Assembly as a
positive instrument for re-writing the 'old' or classical international law and substitut-
ing a 'new', postulated more progressive, Third World-oriented, international law in
its place." Id.
38. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1984, Sec. 1, at p. 1, col. 6. (statement of Asst. Secy.
of State Gregory J. Newell announcing the United States withdrawal from Unesco).
39. Out of over one hundred and sixty member nations of Unesco, less than
10% are Western nations. This imbalance in membership and its effect on voting
patterns was partially responsible for the United States withdrawal in 1984. Critics of
Unesco contended that the organization's approach to economic, freedom of press
and human rights issues reflected a strong Soviet and Third World influence. See N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1984, § 1, at p. 1, col. 6.
40. UNESCO CONST. preamble (adopted in London, 16 November 1945).
41. For example, within the last decade at Unesco meetings, the Soviet Union
has sought greater control over the press. In 1976, the Soviet Union introduced a
draft Declaration on Mass Media which called for state control over the press. The
draft was revised and presented at the 1978 General Assembly. The revised draft
affirmed human rights but also asserted the need for a new, more just and effective
information and communication order. The draft demands a free flow and a wider
and better balanced dissemination of information. Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Counteract
Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, Res. 4/9.3/2 adopted by the General
Conference. 1 Records of the Gen. Conf., 20th Sess., Paris, 24 Oct.-28 Nov. 1978
(Resolutions) 100-104 (UNESCO).
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In the 1970s, Unesco became the birthplace of the de-
mand for a "more balanced flow of information, '4 2 resulting in
the call for a "new world information and communication or-
der" (NWICO).43 NWICO has been described as an "interna-
tional exchange of information in which nations, which de-
velop their cultural system in an autonomous way and with
complete sovereign control of resources, fully and effectively
participate as independent members of the international com-
munity."44  Under NWICO, developing nations have de-
manded equal access to the world's information resources and
control over foreign media coverage of their nations.45
In 1980, the General Conference of Unesco adopted, by
42. For a brief account of Unesco's activities in the information area, see Naes-
selund, Unesco and the Press in The Third World, in THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREE-
DOM 210 (P. Horton ed. 1978). The demand continues today and is heard increas-
ingly in the United Nations, Unesco, meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Conference on
Science and Technology for Development (UNCTAD) and the World Administrative
Radio Conference (WARC). See J. GUNTER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEBATE ON
THE WORLD "INFORMATION ORDER" 6-7 (1979).
Developing nations' demands in the 1979 WARC are a good example of the con-
cerns being voiced throughout the international agencies that deal with the regula-
tion of information. In the Conference, developing nations pressed for a priori as-
signments of satellite orbital locations and associated frequencies in order to assure
their possession of adequate spectrums, if and when they acquire the technology to
use the resource. Id. at 39-42.
43. New World Information and Communication Order. Unesco Gen. Conf.
Res. 21 4/19 (21st. session, Belgrade, Oct-Nov. 1980) (NWICO) (the initials
"NWIO" are used interchangeably by some commentators with the initials
"NWICO"). NWICO reflects the effort of the developing nations to "acquire equita-
ble access to the world's information and communications resources ... ." INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION POLICY: SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE
1980's: A REPORT, Sept. 1983, US GPO at 31.
Proponents of NWICO advocate such goals as: control over the news media to
strengthen national political control, control over information and communication to
enhance national economic and social development, assistance in developing hard-
ware, software and personnel infrastructures, obtaining revenue from licensing, tar-
iffs and fees, and "balance" in the flow of information. See Primoff, Introduction, in II
COMMUNICATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (1983); see also Rowan & Waite, supra note
12, at 1344.
Unesco's plan for the NWICO should not be confused with the NIEO (New
World Economic Order), G.A. Res. 3201/3202, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974), which
seeks to distribute the world's wealth and resources more equally among all nations.
44. See Hamilink, Informatics: Third World Call for a New Order, 29 J. COMM. 144,
146 (1979).
45. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 344. Mustapha Masmoudi, a key developing
world proponent of NWICO, defines it in the following manner: "The new world
information order founded on democratic principles seeks to establish relations of
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consensus, an outline of the main elements of NWICO.4 6
NWICO demanded the "elimination of the imbalances and in-
equalities which characterize the present situation, ' '47 "re-
moval of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and
wider and better balanced dissemination of information and
ideas,"' 48 and "freedom of press and information. '49 Repre-
senting primarily the voice of the developing nations,50 Unesco
demanded "freedom of information" by coupling the concept
of freedom with the notion that information must also be "bal-
anced." 5
The establishment of NWICO has generated debate both
within and outside of Unesco. 52 The developed nations oppos-
equality in the communications field between developed and developing nations and
aims at greater justice and greater balance." Masmoudi, supra note 17, at 178.
46. NWICO, supra note 43, at 4.
47. Id. para. i.
48. Id. para. iii.
49. Id. para. v. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussion of defi-
nition of "freedom" of information).
50. This is even more the case now since both the United States and the United
Kingdom have withdrawn from Unesco.
51. See Masmoudi, supra note 17, at 179-82. "[I]nformation in the modern world
is characterized by true imbalances, reflecting the general imbalance that affects the
international community." d. at 172.
52. See Bortnick, supra, note 12, at 344-45; Hajal, supra, note 12, at 251. The
General Conference of Unesco has, however, declined to initiate an international
convention, as Venezuela proposed, nor have they defined NWICO. Id. at 250.
The debate over NWICO has polarized nations along the East-West axis and the
North-South axis, but, interestingly, it has also led to new alliances. For example,
Canada views itself as sharing many concerns similar to those of the developing na-
tions. See generally Clyne Committee Report, supra note 12; supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
Canada also views itself as dominated by developed world information, and fears
a challenge to sovereignty unless control can be regained through transborder data
flow restrictions. The Clyne Committee Report, supra note 12, stated:
Canadian sovereignty in the next generation will depend heavily on tele-
communications. If we wish to have an independent culture, then we will
have to continue to express it through radio and television. If we wish to
control our economy then we will require a sophisticated telecommunica-
tions sector developed and owned in Canada to meet specific Canadian re-
quirements. To maintain our Canadian identity and independence we must
ensure an adequate measure of control over data banks, trans-border data
flow, and the content of information services available in Canada.
Id. at 2.
The Clyne Committee Report stresses the danger to national sovereignty posed
by a dependence on foreign nations with advanced telecommunications technology:
"[I]nformatics is a word that is coming into general international use to describe
computer-communications of all kinds. Of all the technologies that are developing
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ing NWICO have expressed fear of governmental control of
information and the press. 3 Developing nations contend that
the developed nations retain an impermissive control of the
information flow. 54 As an example, they cite to the control ex-
ercised by the four major Western news agencies, which are
responsible for approximately nine tenths of the news trans-
mitted in the world.55 The developing nations' approach, set
forth in the NWICO guidelines, is to exercise control of this
information flow to achieve the desired balance of information
from developed and developing nations. 6 A Unesco report
summarized the concerns of the developing nations:
Operating on a world-wide scale, some information agen-
cies - most of which have their headquarters in one of the
industrialized countries - have, by reason of their equip-
ment and capital, acquired a position of strength which
probably enables them to offer better services but also leads
them to convey one-way information reflecting the point of
view of those countries, and which, above all, allows them to
dominate the information market to an extent that borders
57on cultural aggression...
Western nations agree that the information flow is con-
trolled by the West but their proposed solution to this prob-
lem focuses on the training of personnel from the developing
nations and the initiation of news organizations in the develop-
so rapidly today, that of informatics poses possibly the most dangerous threat to Ca-
nadian sovereignty .... Id. at 57.
The possibility of increased transborder data flow restrictions has also prompted
the United States to examine its own vulnerability. George McGovern, as former
Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, stated that: "[o]ne way to 'attack' a nation such as the
United States, which depends heavily on information and communications, is to re-
strain the flow of information - cutting off contact between the headquarters and
the overseas branches of a multinational firm; taxing telecommunications crossing
borders; building information walls around a nation." McGovern, The Information
Age, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1977, at A21, col. 2.
53. See generally Theberge, supra note 18.
54. Hajnal, supra note 12, at 251 (comments of Frank Campbell, Information
Minister of Guyana).
55. Id. at 251. The news agencies are Associated Press, United Press Interna-
tional, Reuters and Agence France-Presse. Id. at 349.
56. See generally Masmoudi, supra note 17.
57. UNESCO, MOVING TOWARDS CHANGE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NEW INFORMA-
TION AND ECONOMIC ORDER 91 (1976).
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ing world, not the control of existing news sources.58
Existing international agreements and the efforts of
Unesco have so far proved inadequate to handle the interna-
tional legal problems that transborder data flow restrictions
have created. As a result of the withdrawal of the United States
and the United Kingdom from Unesco,59 the development of
multilateral international legislation to address the problems
of transborder data flow restrictions will have limited useful-
ness. There is controversy as to whether the existing interna-
tional agreements are binding.60 Even if the agreements are
considered binding, the definitions and interpretations given
to the term "freedom of information" by the developed and
developing nations are diametrically opposed61 , making any
agreement largely ineffectual.
II. SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND THE IMPACT
OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW ON
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Many developing nations lack an information infrastruc-
ture62 that would provide them with the equipment and per-
sonnel needed to process data and to initiate their own infor-
mation sources. Thus, these nations must export data for
58. Id. India followed the Western nations' suggestion and announced its inten-
tion to build a worldwide press organization around its national news service,
Samachar. See Tatarian, News Flow in the Third World. An Overview, in THE THIRD
WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 20 (P. Horton ed. 1978). Additionally, several develop-
ing nations organized the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool (NANAP) the goal of
which is "intended to achieve broad and free circulation ... of news ... about each
other, and also provide objective and authentic information relative to non-aligned
countries to the rest of the world." Specialized Ministerial Conference of Non-
Aligned Countries: Ministerial Conference on the Press Agencies Pool, July 8-13,
1976, reprinted in 0. JANKOWITSCH & K. SAUVANT, THIRD WORLD WITHOUT SUPERPOW-
ERS: THE COLLECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES 1563 (1978).
Another NWICO debate arising out of the fear of control surrounds the issue of
journalistic licensing. Developing nations are trying to implement licensing by gov-
ernmental or international organization in order to achieve what they consider jour-
nalistic protection. See Theberge, supra note 18, at 716.
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
62. Information infrastructure describes a nation's institutions, organizations,
resources and services which in combination accomplish the flow and delivery of in-
formation. India provides an excellent example of the development of an informa-
tion infrastructure. In the 1960's, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi delivered an ultima-
tum to International Business Machines, Inc. (IBM) either to share equity in the In-
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processing and import information for informed social, eco-
nomic, and political decision-making as well as for entertain-
ment purposes. This need to export data and import informa-
tion is self- perpetuating. As long as it continues, domestic in-
dustries will not be created to enable the developing nation to
process its own information.63
One type of transborder data flow restriction that can
solve this problem requires multinational corporations to de-
velop local subsidiaries, personnel and facilities to process data
within the developing nation. 64 For example, Brazil's in-
formatics policy requires multinational corporations to use
Brazilian computers, in Brazil, to accomplish their processing
needs, if local computers can accomplish the necessary task.65
In order to ensure that computers are available to meet this
need, Brazil has centralized control of the purchase of com-
puters by the national government and as far back as 1975 was
buying computer equipment at the rate of US$275,000,000. a
year.66 A policy such as Brazil's can have a positive effect so-
cially and economically for the developing nation as it spurs
domestic industries, providing jobs and increasing technical
competence. Transborder data flow restrictions can also in-
crease the host country's 67 leverage in economic decision mak-
ing by requiring the decentralization of multinational corpora-
tions and demanding that equity be given locally.68
Although transborder data flow restrictions may allow the
developing nations some control over cultural erosion and
economic vulnerability, the restrictions can be costly. Restric-
dian subsidiaries or leave the country. IBM refused and because the nation lacked an
information infrastructure, the government was forced to retreat.
Again, in 1970, Gandhi issued the same ultimatum. By this time, however, India
had developed an infrastructure of information services to strengthen its bargaining
position. During the previous decade India had been training programmers and de-
veloping a local microcomputer industry. India was able to stand firmly behind its
ultimatum and IBM withdrew. See Grieco, Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Ex-
perience with the International Computer Industry, 36 INT'L ORG. 609, 612-32 (1982).
63. See Sauvant, Transborder Data Flows and the Developing Countries, 37 INT'L ORG.
359, 366 (1983).
64. Brazil has implemented such a policy. See generally Bortnick, supra note 12, at
340-42; Hardy, supra note 12, at 254.
65. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 254.
66. Id.
67. Host country refers to the country where the subsidiary is located.
68. See Samiee, supra note 1, at 143.
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tive legislation prevents local organizations from contracting
data services abroad, resulting in lost revenue to the provider
country and harm to the developing nation since it severely
restricts the alternatives available for data services. 69 Trans-
border data flow restrictions may prohibit the import of for-
eign computer equipment, resulting in lost revenue to the pro-
vider nation and harm to the developing nation, which may
lack equivalent technology.70
Multinational corporations are strongly opposed to trans-
border data flow restrictions. 7' They view restrictive legisla-
tion as prohibitively increasing the cost of doing business.
Additionally, transborder data flow restrictions inhibit the
development of technology. 72 For example, the Brazilian
transborder data flow regulations require multinational corpo-
rations to disclose information that may compromise proprie-
tary rights,73 and force the corporation to establish duplicate
data processing facilities in Brazil, despite the much higher
CoSt.74 In order to avoid increases in cost and disclosure re-
quirements, enterprises may choose less effective means of
communication or may simply decide not to enter a particular
market.75
Governments of developed nations and multinational cor-
porations share the concern about the potential of data flow
restrictions for censoring ideas76 and monitoring business. 77
Restrictive legislation invites government inspection and regu-
lation of business data, providing a vehicle for monitoring and
eventually controlling the flow of business data.78
Despite these objections, many developing nations con-
69. See Note, Transborder Data Flow: Problems with the Council of Europe Convention or
Protecting States from Protectionism, 4 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 601, 614 (1982).
70. Id.
71. See generally McKeaver, supra note 1; Samiee, How Transnational Data Flow
Laws Affect Marketers, BUSINESS, July-Sept. 1984, at 18.
72. Grossman, Transborder Data Flow: Separating the Privacy Interests of Individuals
and Corporations, 4 Nw.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 1, 5 (1982).
73. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 342.
74. Id. at 343.
75. Id.
76. See generally Theberge, supra note 18.
77. See Rankin, supra note 3, at 227.
78. Id. Multinational corporations are also concerned that this type of extensive
governmental monitoring raises the possibility of the theft of business secrets by gov-
ernments and other industries. See generally Coombe, Privacy, Data Protection, and
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tinue to restrict the flow of information. The challenge to sov-
ereignty that prompts nations to impose transborder data flow
restrictions has two principal components: (1) economic vul-
nerability and (2) cultural erosion.79
A. Prevention of "Economic Vulnerability"
Developing nations view barriers to transborder data flow
as necessary to prevent dependence on developed nations,
which may result in economic vulnerability."0 Economic vul-
nerability is associated with the loss of control over data when
it is sent to a processing or storage country, l or whenever a
developing nation must depend exclusively on the developed
nations for technological services or information sources.8 2
Economic vulnerability is illustrated by the use of "remote
earth sensing" satellites.83 In developed nations, information
collected by these satellites is used by both private enterprise
Transborder Data Flow: A Corporate Response to International Expectations, 39 Bus. LAw. 33
(1983).
79. These same concerns have motivated several Western nations to adopt ex-
tensive transborder data flow legislation. See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development: Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, OECD Doc. c(80) 58 (Final)
(Oct. 1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981); Council of Europe: Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan.
28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981). See generally Bing, The
Council of Europe Convention and OECD Guidelines on Data Protection, 1984 MICH. Y.B.
INT'L. L. STUD. 271; Feketekuty, supra note 22, at 150-56.
80. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
81. Canada's experience with transborder data flow is analogous to the experi-
ence of developing nations. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Clyne
Committee Report, supra note 12, examined Canada's concern with economic vulner-
ability. The Report concluded that transborder data flow posed a serious threat to
Canadian sovereignty. The Report recommended the- adoption of protectionist
measures, including strict transborder data flow legislation to protect Canadian sov-
ereignty. Id. at 63-65; see also Eger, supra note 14, at 224-25.
Sweden provides another example of vulnerability when data is processed or
stored outside of the country. The data processing service used by the Fire Depart-
ment of Malmo, Sweden, stores architectural firefighting information in a data base
located in Cleveland, Ohio. Burnham, United States is Worried by World Efforts to Curtail
Freedom of Information, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1978, at Al, col. 3. This example illus-
trates the importance foreign stored data bases may have on domestic stability.
82. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
83. "Remote earth sensing by satellite" (RES) is the collection by one nation of
geographical, topographical, meteorological, military and other forms of data about
another nation through observance by satellite. See Groshan, Transnational Data
Flows: Is the Idea of an International Legal Regime Relevant in Establishing Multilateral Con-
trols and Legal Norms?, 15 LAw TECH. 1, 1-2 (1982).
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and governmental agencies in planning natural resource devel-
opment. 84 Developing nations, in contrast, lack the informa-
tion infrastructure8 5 to process, store and analyze their own
natural resource data. They must depend on foreign enter-
prises to collect and sort the data, and then buy back the infor-
mation at a higher price, possibly without the full information
the processing country gleaned from the data8 6 Lack of com-
plete information may result in economic vulnerability and
may allow developers of non-renewable natural resources, usu-
ally Western multinational corporations, to enjoy greater eco-
nomic advantages.8 7
Governments of developing nations perceive Western
multinational corporations as an increasing cause of economic
vulnerability.88 For a multinational corporation, transborder
data flow is both a commercial good and a management tool.
8 9
The parent corporation uses the subsidiaries to access re-
sources,90 and subsidiaries are linked to the parent company
through terminals which rely on transborder data flow to
transmit information and conduct operations. 9' With the locus
of control in the parent company, the developing nation is vir-
tually powerless to exercise control over, or have the ability to
participate in, corporate policy decisions which may affect their
nation. 2 Multinational corporations use the inexpensive labor
and resources of the developing nations to their advantage,
making the developing nation economically vulnerable.93
84. Id. at 2.
85. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 338-39, 347-48.
87. See Eger, supra note 14, at 231-32.
88. Interestingly, one commentator has suggested that the multinational corpo-
ration may be the most likely source of a "solution to the data flow crisis." Dunn,
supra, note 3, at 86. The author reasons that the multinationals will be motivated by
pragmatic concerns that will transcend nationalism, and additionally, they are not
burdened by having to reconcile data flow with "parochial" national policy. Id. This
may be a solution to the conflicts between the developed nations but may oversim-
plify the problems faced by the developing nations.
89. Sauvant, supra note 63, at 360.
90. See Samiee, supra note 1, at 142-43.
91. Sauvant, supra note 63, at 364.
92. The direct benefits from a multinational corporation to a host country occur
generally at the processing and distribution stages, hence they normally will not ac-
crue to the developing country. Id. at 366.
93. Even as a developing nation enters the information age, the multinational
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B. Prevention of "Cultural Erosion"
Developing nations view their sovereignty as threatened
by the cultural erosion they perceive occurs due to unrestricted
transborder data flow. Commercial, economic and political
planning information, if controlled by developed nations, may
lead to cultural erosion within the developing nation. 94 Popu-
lations of developing nations generally have limited exposure
to conflicting foreign values and high illiteracy rates, making
the people particularly vulnerable to an influx of uncontrolled
developed world information.95 Developing nations fear that
programming from developed nations may endanger the cul-
tural heritage of their nations. Domestic information sources,
such as local radio and television stations and news services,
are usually extremely limited and developing nations are
forced to rely on foreign controlled information sources and
news services. 6 Therefore, developing nations are at the
"mercy of the decisions of journalists, or the centres of infor-
mation, which decide what to publish and what not to publish
- it is their privilege."9 7 Freedom of information becomes, in
fact, "freedom of the informing agent."' 98 Developing nations
characterize this as a developed world attempt at "electronic
colonialism" and "cultural imperialism." 99
As an example of this so-called "cultural imperialism", de-
veloping nations point to the negative image the developed
world has fostered of developing nations by focusing news cov-
erage on sensational disasters instead of developmental issues,
representing their nations in what they consider to be an un-
sympathetic and biased light.' 00 There is a tendency among
corporations are only allocating simple activities to their industries, leaving the more
sophisticated processing in the developed countries. Id.
94. See infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
95. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 339-40; see also Nova: Global Village, Transcript
No. 1202, 12-14 (broadcast on WGBH-Boston, Mass., Jan. 22, 1985) (hereinafter
"Nova Transcript").
96. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 339-40; see also Nova Transcript, supra note 95
(discussion of the effect of India's satellite system and television usage); Feketekuty,
supra note 22, at 151.
97. 18 U.N. Chronicle, June 1981 (remarks of Miguel Albornoz of Ecuador, the
head of the United Nations Committee on Information).
98. See Masmoudi, supra note 17, at 175.
99. See Eger, supra note 14, at 209.
100. See N. Aggarwala, Development Forum, October 1978, reprinted in Masmoudi,
supra note 17, at 180-81; Note, The New World Information and Communication Order.- Is
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developed world media, including news agencies, to direct the
most attention to developing nations in times of disaster, cri-
sis, and confrontation.10 1 Correspondents are brought into the
developing nation to cover an emergency and then leave im-
mediately thereafter. Coverage then returns to the status quo,
which means, in many places, little if any coverage of political,
social or cultural events.' 0 2 Developing nations' concern is
twofold: they do not want developed nations imposing a cul-
tural bias through external means, such as television, films or
radio broadcasts, nor do they want the internal dealings of
their country presented solely through the eyes of news orga-
nizations they perceive as hostile to their planning or political
objectives. 10 3
Fear of cultural erosion extends beyond commercial pro-
gramming to all forms of data flow that reflect the institutions
and traditions of the processing or controlling country. 10 4
Each time a developing nation allows data to be stored abroad,
cultural erosion may occur. The storage nation may impose its
own value system on the customer nation by selectively releas-
ing information. 0 5 The processing nations make administra-
tive decisions based on the developing nations data, perhaps
not even aware that they are imposing a cultural bias on the
countries affected.10 6
the International Programme for the Development of Communication the Answer?, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 953 (1983); see also Theberge, supra note 18, at 715-16. An example
of concern over media imbalance is Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's criticism of for-
eign news reporting: "India's achievements are ignored with a perverse consistency,
while its shortcomings are presented with exaggerated glee." N.Y.Times, Sept. 20,
1981, § 1, at 4, cols. 4-5.
Mustapha Masmoudi, a member of Unesco's International Commission for the
Study of Communications, called for a new world information order, proposing the
"regulation of the right to information by preventing abusive uses of the right of
access to information." Unesco Doc. 20C/31 at 6 (1978). The new world informa-
tion order proposed also envisaged the establishment of a supranational organization
to rectify false and biased news acts. Id. at 18.
101. See Tatarian, supra note 58, at 25-8.
102. Id.
103. See Masmoudi, supra note 17, at 180-82.
104. See Bortnick, supra note 12, at 339.
105. See Note, supra note 69, at 617. If the storage nation withholds information,
either deliberately or accidently, proper decisions can not be made in the developing
nation. Id.; see also Groshan, supra note 4, at 13-14; Grossman, supra note 72, at 18.
106. See Grossman, supra note 72, at 18.
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR A VIABLE
INTERNATIONAL FORUM
A number of organizations worldwide have been involved
in the discussion and attempted resolution of transborder data
flow problems, 10 7 but to date there has been very little pro-
gress on an international scale, largely because of the
politicization of the issue. The politicization of communica-
tions issues, and the coordinate call for the development of
NWICO and NIEO,' 0 8 led to the withdrawal of the United
States and the United Kingdom from Unesco. The effect of
that withdrawal was to diminish Unesco's viability as an inter-
national forum for the resolution of transborder data flow
problems. Until recently, Unesco had led the way in the dis-
cussion of communications issues, by providing a forum for
both developing and developed nations to voice their concerns
and grievances. 0 9 A new international forum must now be de-
veloped to deal with the myriad of conflicting national trans-
border data flow restrictions. As the world is brought closer by
technology, the imposition of transborder data flow restric-
tions succeeds only in expanding the gap technology is trying
to close.
A major hurdle to productive discussions is the defini-
tional dispute. All nations embrace a concept of freedom of
information, but define it differently. Some nations impose re-
strictions on information in the name of sovereignty while
others consider such restrictions as fundamentally opposed to
the principle of freedom of information. The result is conflict
and stalemate and in turn this breeds the politicization that
must be avoided if constructive and substantive dialogue is to
take place.
An alternative to the development of an international fo-
107. Organizations involved in the discussion on transborder data flow include
the United Nations, Unesco, the Non-Aligned Movement, the International Telecom-
munications Union, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development (UNCTAD) and the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC).
See J. GUNTER, supra note 42, at 8.
108. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
109. See Nanda, The Communication Revolution and the Free Flow of Information in a
Transnational Setting, 30 AM. J. CoMp. L. 411,414 (Supp. 1982). Unesco's role in the
international debate is evidenced by the development of NWICO, which has been
evolving during the last decade at Unesco's biennial conferences. See Theberge, supra
note 18, at 714.
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rum for both developed and developing nations is to let the
multinational corporations - those most affected economi-
cally by the restrictions - create the international standards of
conduct."10 The tremendous variety and inconsistency of the
transborder data flow regulatory schemes has created an ex-
tremely expensive administrative nightmare. 1 For a multina-
tional to function efficiently in many developed as well as de-
veloping nations, it must adjust itself to each nation's require-
ments for information flow. Commentators argue that since
the survival of the multinational corporation is dependent on
its ability to pass information among its subsidiaries, and this
ability is severely constrained by transborder data flow restric-
tions, the multinational may be the most likely source for a so-
lution to the data flow crisis. 1 2 It is argued that the multina-
tional corporation will be motivated by pragmatic concerns
that can "transcend national boundaries", and will not have
the burden of reconciling transborder data flow with national
policy. 1 3
As appealing as this proposal may sound, it does not ade-
quately address the legitimate concerns of the developing na-
tions. Whether such definitions of sovereignty or freedom of
information are acceptable, it is clear that many are facing an
information crisis caused by the lack of an information infra-
structure. That problem will not be solved if the multination-
als take control of policy. The multinationals may have "prag-
matic" concerns but these concerns will be self-serving and are
likely to ignore the developing world's problems of cultural
and economic erosion. Additionally, multinationals are con-
trolled by organizations based primarily in Western nations, a
fact that is likely to cause considerable suspicion in the devel-
oping world.
The answer must lie in the creation of a viable interna-
tional forum of developed and developing nations. Recently, a
proposal was published that attempted to lay the groundwork
for such a forum. The Maitland Commission 1 4 was created by
110. See generally Dunn, supra note 3.
111. Id. at 86.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. This Commission, headed by Sir Donald Maitland and composed of seven-
teen members from representative nations, was appointed in 1982 by the Interna-
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the International Telecommunications Union 1 5 in 1982. After
several years of study, it proposed a new Center for Telecom-
munications Development whose purpose would be to provide
planning and technical assistance to developing nations for the
improvement of their telecommunications infrastructure. The
proposed Center, staffed by "disinterested professionals",
would focus on three major areas: 1) development planning, 2)
preinvestment organization and planning and 3) operations
support. 116
Unfortunately, as needed as this type of assistance is, the
proposal suffers from the same major problems that have
plagued other international forums addressing this issue. Any
United States cooperation in the venture is likely to be viewed
with suspicion. For instance, United States government efforts
to provide technical assistance to developing nations have
been viewed as motivated at least partly by a desire to diffuse
the campaign for the NWICO and the NIEO. 1 17 Conse-
quently, any perception that the United States or any other de-
veloped nation is using the Center to "buy-off" the developing
nations will impede the usefulness of the Center or of any in-
ternational forum."18
The politicization of transborder data flow means that any
forum must be composed of both developing and developed
nations and must draw its funding from sources that will pre-
serve its multilateral nature. If the developed world is primar-
ily responsible for the funding of the organization, suspicion
will be immediately created among the developing nations. A
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) Plenipotentiary Conference. The Commis-
sion's mandate was to recommend ways in which the worldwide telecommunications
expansion could be stimulated. See Rowan & Waite, supra note 12, at 1341.
115. The ITU is a United Nations agency but predates the United Nations by
over eighty years. Its role throughout its history has been to regulate the technical
and administrative functioning of telephone, teletype and broadcast systems as they
passed national boundaries. Id at 1339 n.l. See generally G. CODDING, JR. & A.
RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD
(1982).
116. See Rowan & Waite, supra note 12, at 1342.
117. Id. at 1345. The Communications Counsel in the Bureau of Programs of
the United States Information Agency stated it bluntly, "[i]t was a real quid pro quo
policy: if you abandon the rhetoric, we will help you with communications develop-
ment assistance." Read, United States Government Involvement, in II COMMUNICATION IN
A CHANGING WORLD 60 (1983).
118. See Rowan & Waite, supra note 12, at 1345-46.
2851986-1987]
286 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:262
further source of conflict is the definitional problem. If the
terms "freedom of information" and "sovereignty" are used
by the participants and yet hold very different meanings for all,
the forum will accomplish nothing.
For an international forum to be viable, it must include all
nations involved in transborder data flow and have a source of
funding not drawn primarily from the United States or major
Western European nations. It must be pledged to examine
and address the very real problems of the developing nations
with respect to cultural and economic erosion. But most of all,
the rhetoric of freedom of information must be abandoned and
nations must work from the premise that control of informa-
tion flowing across a nation's boundaries is a sovereign right.
Without the latter, the developing nations will not give the fo-
rum the credibility it must have to reach an accord. The devel-
oping nations have definite concerns that must be addressed,
but to start the discussion by concluding that what is being dis-
cussed is outside their sovereign rights will result in nothing
being achieved. To make progress, the discussion must get
past the political and rhetorical hurdles of freedom of informa-
tion and sovereign rights. That is not what is crucial. The cru-
cial issue is an increasingly interdependent world that is being
progressively divided by national restrictions on the flow of in-
formation. The developed nations and their multinational cor-
porations are being hurt by the imposition of further trans-
border data flow restrictions, the developing nations are being
hurt because needed information is not reaching their nations.
A viable international forum must be created.
CONCLUSION
By controlling information, nations may enhance their
global and national positions. Both developed and developing
nations are imposing transborder data flow restrictions in the
name of privacy protection, national security and sovereignty.
In reality, the motivation behind such restrictions is power
over information.
The need for power is escalating the global race to impose
transborder data flow restrictions. International organizations
and agreements presently in existence are of limited assist-
1986-1987] TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW 287
ance." 9 It is debatable if the agreeements are binding, and
even if they are, the disparity of definitions renders them prac-
tically non-binding.
Theoretically, transborder data flow should bring the
world's people closer, eliminating geographic distances and
making information access instantaneous, resulting in an inter-
dependent global economy. In reality, transborder data flow is
creating new barriers among the world's governments. New
agreements and an effective international forum must be de-
veloped to prevent further erosion.
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